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In 1960, just as the Supreme Court in the Steelworkers Trilogy was singing
the praises of collective bargaining and arbitration as cogs in a great regime of
"industrial self-government,"' a dramatic change was about to take place.
Beginning with the Equal Pay Act of 19632 and extending for more than a
decade thereafter, Congress enacted a series of statutes concerned with
employment discrimination, occupational health and safety, and pension
rights.3 In a number of respects, these enactments marked the end of the view
of labor relations celebrated in the Steelworkers Trilogy.
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1. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580 (1960); see also
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568-69 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596-98 (1960).
2. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982)).
3. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982)) (prohibiting employment
discrimination on the basis of an individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982)) (prohibiting employment discrimination against individuals between
40 and 70 years of age); Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 304, 82 Star.
146, 163-64 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1674 (1982)) (prohibiting discharge of an employee because his
earnings have been subject to garnishment for one indebtedness); Construction Safety Act of 1969,
Pub. L. No. 91-54, 83 Stat. 96 (codified at 40 U.S.C. § 333 (1982)) (establishing safety and health
requirements in the construction industry); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-596, 84 Star. 1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982)) (establishing safety and
health requirements for all covered employers); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87
Stat. 355 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1982 & Supp. I 1983)) (prohibiting,
generally, employment discrimination against handicapped individuals); Employee Retirement
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At the time of enactment of both the Wagner4 and Taft-Hartley5 Acts, the
prevalent notion was that labor relations were essentially private matters, to
be regulated by contract.6 The principal role of public law was to insure that
unions were accorded an opportunity to organize and bargain collectively and
to regulate the tactics of labor and management in the processes of
organizing, bargaining, and pressuring. Within very broad limits, what the
two sides agreed upon was their business alone. The same notion applied to
the resolution of grievances. For a considerable time, there were even
inhibitions about citing arbitral awards construing similar contract provisions
as persuasive authority in arbitration proceedings-so private and sui generis
was each proceeding thought to be.
Nor was this mere laissez-faire. The matter went further, and here, too,
the Steelworkers Trilogy is the high water mark of the prevailing ideology: the
business of collective bargaining was so complex that it was futile for public
bodies to attempt to specify terms or to participate too actively in their
enforcement. Collective bargaining entailed a series of intricate mutual
adjustments that only the parties could make; grievances involved a "common
law of a particular industry or of a particular plant"7 that only experts,
immersed in labor lore, but not necessarily in labor law, could fathom. Hence
the extraordinary deference accorded by the Trilogy to the mystique of the
arbitral process.8
The 1960's were a decade when, perhaps above all, arcane arrangements
were distrusted and expertise was debunked. It is therefore not surprising
that Congress should be far less reticent than it had been previously about
laying down standards at the workplace. To be sure, Congress had earlier
done some of the same. The Fair Labor Standards Act 9 is most notable in this
respect, for it established unequivocal wage and hour limits. But the Fair
Labor Standards Act was passed in 1938, and it is fair to say that, for a quarter
century thereafter-despite the ineluctable tendency toward federal control
during wartime-the dominant view of labor legislation was the framework
view, the view that conceived the National Labor Relations Board as an umpire
monitoring a game played by others.
Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983)) (establishing standards for employee pension plans).
4. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1982)).
5. Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982)).
6. Even at the ebb of union influence, at the time the Landrum-Griffin Act was passed, there
was no notion of substituting rights under public law for rights gained by contractual negotiation.
Rather, the thrust of the Landrum-Griffin Act was to cleanse and democratize union operations. See
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982).
7. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 579 (1960); see also
Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965).
8. See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568-69 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596-99 (1960).
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
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The new view did not, of course, wholly supplant the old-although the
extent to which the two can coexist remains an open question. But the new
view, which perhaps can be called the substantive rights view, was that in certain
areas what labor and management agreed to, or failed to agree to, was very
much everybody's business, not just their own. In age, sex, and race
discrimination, in health and safety at the workplace, and in the retirement
field, collective bargaining fell short of public expectations in two respects.
First, the National Labor Relations Act may have encouraged unionization-
although some would say it merely encouraged free choice on the question-
but it did nothing if employees declined the opportunity to join unions and to
bargain collectively. For the majority of the work force that was not subject to
collective bargaining, the most stringent antidiscrimination and health and
safety provisions in collective agreements obviously provided no protection
whatever. Moreover, in the area of discrimination, many unions did not have
a particularly enviable record and could hardly be expected to use collective
bargaining as a weapon against discrimination, even in the sector subject to
collective bargaining. Second, in any case, the evolving national consensus
was that in these areas uniform treatment of the entire labor force, rather than
merely of those employees subject to collective bargaining, was required.
This uniform treatment could not be accomplished by anything resembling a
framework view-substantive rights had to be conferred.
Those substantive rights have tended to become more detailed over the
years. Despite the copious provisions of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), for example, in the main it merely put
regulatory limits on pension plan provisions excluding employees from
participating in such plans or becoming eligible for benefits.' 0 The
Retirement Equity Act of 1984, however, went much further; its manifest
purpose was to provide greater pension equity for women and spouses of
employees, and to that end it actually required spousal consent to certain
beneficiary designations by employees." Likewise, in the case of race, sex,
and age discrimination, the fairly cryptic requirements of the applicable
statutes have been developed by judicial decision into formidable bodies of
doctrine.' 2 In the case of occupational health and safety, the appropriate
administrative agencies have produced voluminous regulations. 13 Whether
by statute, judicial decision, or regulation, the substantive requirements of the
law have grown increasingly specific.
In a fairly short time, therefore, the employment relation has become, to a
considerable extent, deprivatized. Indeed, the employment relation is now
heavily regulated by public, largely federal, law. The framework view of labor
10. See Leibig, The Deprivatization of Employee Benefit and Labor Law: The Surprising Conservative
Erosion of Trusts and of the Competitive Labor Model, L.Aw & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1986, at 185, 194.
11. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, § 103, 98 Stat. 1426 (amending 29
U.S.C. § 1055 (1982)).
12. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdin, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); McDonnell-
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
13. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Standards, 29 C.F.R. § 1910 (1984).
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law is a thing of the past. The shop steward is no longer-if he ever was-the
exclusive guardian of employee welfare, even in the union shop.
That is not to say, of course, that discontinuity is the only theme worthy of
emphasis. Some of the new rights are traceable ultimately to the earlier law.
The drive to place pension benefits on a secure statutory footing, culminating
in the enactment of ERISA in 1974, has roots in judicial decisions of a quarter
century earlier, decisions holding pensions to be a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining. 14 Roughly at the same time as the enactment of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a doctrine was evolving that racial
discrimination by a labor union in the administration of a collective
agreement was a breach of the union's duty of fair representation.' 5 But it
certainly cannot be claimed that the Wagner Act framework was in any way
adequate to meet the problems for which new statutory responses were
devised, beginning around 1963. To have put the National Labor Relations
Board wholeheartedly in the business of insuring safety, enforcing pension
requirements, or eradicating discrimination would have taxed its process with
enforcement demands so inapt for the Board's existing structure as to invite
failure on several fronts.1 6
The problems to which the statutes responded were various, and readers
of this volume will no doubt be struck by the diversity of specific issues as they
move from one subject area to another. But in a sense that is exactly the
point: the newer statutory interests do not necessarily have very much in
common except that they are intended to redress felt deficiencies in the
employment relation left in some considerable measure unredressed by the
collective bargaining regime. The result is that the employment relation is
now freighted with a plethora of different regulatory requirements and
enforcement mechanisms. Some rights are left to private negotiation and
enforcement, some to wholly public enforcement, some to public action upon
the complaint of private parties. Some matters are left to contract, some to
statute and regulation, some to common law. Some issues are confided to
arbitration, some to administrative agencies, some to the courts, even in the
first instance. The sheer range of enforcement procedures and forums is
testimony to the recognition of particular rights at various times.
14. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949); see
also NLRB v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952).
15. See Local Union No. 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967); NLRB v. Local 1367, International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 368 F.2d
1010 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967); Independent Metal Workers, 1964 NLRB Dec.
(CCH) 13,250; cf. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). The right to
nondiscriminatory access to union membership dates back to Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S.
192 (1944), decided under the Railway Labor Act.
16. In a much discussed decision, NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963), the
Second Circuit had split three ways on whether the National Labor Relations Act rendered
discrimination by a union based on grounds other than union membership or nonmembership an
unfair labor practice. The case did not involve discrimination on grounds of age, sex, or race, but it
was understood to implicate the role of the Board in racial discrimination cases. Underlying the
various opinions were divergent views on the ability of the Board to cope with such matters on a
large scale.
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The enforcement of these public law rights raises many questions relating
to their fit with rights achieved through collective bargaining and with
remedies for enforcing collective agreements. The tensions between seniority
rights deriving from collective agreements and affirmative action rights
deriving from interpretation of Title VII are well known.' 7 Similar tensions
exist with respect to safety standards laid down in collective agreements and
those required by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.' 8 It
must not be supposed, of course, that these tensions present altogether new
problems, for the same issues have arisen with respect to overtime pay due
under a collective agreement and overtime pay due under the Fair Labor
Standards Act. 19 What is new is the extent to which these tensions are now
built into labor law.
The matter extends to remedies as well, for, as the Trilogy made clear, the
arbitral remedy, described by justice Douglas as "therapeutic, '" 20 was the drug
of choice for putative violations of the collective agreement. But if there is
one thing that is clear about arbitration, it is that it is a private proceeding,
largely unaccountable to public law standards. The new statutory rights are
squarely in the domain of public law, enforceable by public bodies, such as the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Where an employer's conduct
was arguably an unfair labor practice and a violation of the collective
agreement, the law had earlier struggled with the question of whether the
union was to proceed first with the National Labor Relations Board or with
the arbitrator, and it had finally established doctrines relating to which body
would defer to which and what effect a prior determination by one or the
other would have. 2' The matter is now complicated in two additional ways.
First, the rights conferred by statute are granted to individual employees, who
had previously for the most part been content to let unions pursue alleged
violations with arbitrators or with the Board. Now, however, individuals
might go one way with their public law rights while unions go another with
their grievances or unfair labor practice charges. 22 Second, there are no
longer two forums but three: the arbitrator, the NLRB, and the
administrative agency (and/or court) charged with enforcement of the new
public law rights. The Trilogy has given way to the triangle.
All decisionmakers, including the Supreme Court, have had to grapple
with a new layer of legal issues surrounding the apportionment of authority to
bring and to hear claims. And arbitrators have increasingly been faced with
17. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local
Union 759, United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
18. For a discussion, see Feller, The Impact of External Law Upon Labor Arbitration, in American
Arbitration Ass'n, THE FUTURE OF LABOR ARBITRATION IN AMERICA 83, 97-99 (1976).
19. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
20. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960).
21. See generally Bond, The Concurrence Conundrum: The Overlapping Jurisdiction of Arbitration and the
NLRB, 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 4 (1968). Absent an arbitration clause, there was and is also the possibility
of an action under section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982), for breach of the
collective agreement. Cf NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967).
22. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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problems that arose only rarely under the former regime-namely, whether
and to what extent they should entertain arguments founded upon public law
in proceedings that derive from a collective agreement. The arbitration of
pension claims had just become a new specialty, complete with a separate set
of American Arbitration Association rules, when ERISA claims began to be
raised in tandem with claims deriving from pension trust agreements. If
arbitrators do not hear such arguments, the arbitrators will no longer be the
final authority, the Trilogy to the contrary notwithstanding. If arbitrators do
hear the arguments, they can hardly maintain the private character of their
proceedings, which is the raison d'etre of arbitration. On such grounds, David
Feller has suggested that the growth of substantive public law sounds the
death knell of the arbitral process. 23 Yet labor arbitration continues to grow,
which in some ways is more troublesome, for the system of grievance
processing has become increasingly complex. In the United States, few policy
problems are solved by scratching out the old arrangements and starting
fresh. Accretion is the characteristic way of solving problems in this country.
The disposition to add rather than to start over is very much in evidence in
the labor relations field.
Indeed, the diversity of rights and forums is increasing yet again. In the
late 1970's, the doctrine of employment at will began to erode very seriously,
so much so that about half the states have now created important exceptions
to the doctrine. 24 State courts are hearing cases of employee discharge with
increasing regularity and finding a significant number of discharges unlawful
as a matter of common law or state public policy.
The ironies of this development are manifold. The common law courts,
once so hostile to labor as to thwart collective organization at every turn, are
now hospitable to claims that augur considerable enhancement ofjob security
across the board. The new common law rights25 are enunciated and
vindicated at the very moment the Labor Board and reviewing courts evince
serious, perhaps excessive, solicitude for management flexibility, concern that
neither the Wagner Act nor collective agreements be construed to lock
management into expensive, inefficient job security arrangements.2 6
Moreover, the states that have carried exceptions to at-will employment
furthest tend to be those with the largest number of unionized workers.2 7 It is
thus quite possible that an employee in a nonunion shop in such a state may
23. Feller, supra note 18.
24. For a state-by-state survey, see A.B.A. LIT. SEC., 1984 REPORT (report of the Employment
and Labor Relations Law Committee).
25. How new these rights are remains open to question. There is an argument to be made that
employment at will was a doctrine firmly established only in the last quarter of the nineteenth
century, prior to which there existed certain implied obligations prohibiting termination without just
cause. L. Wirthlin, Factors Spurring Judicial Modification of the Employment at Will Doctrine 1-2
(Dec. 6, 1984) (unpublished manuscript).
26. See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981); United Technologies
Corp., 1984-5 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 17,159; Illinois Coil Spring Co., 1983-84 NLRB Dec. (CCH)
16,029; aff'd sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 763 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1985); cf NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,
465 U.S. 513 (1984).
27. L. Wirthlin, supra note 25, at 17-18.
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have more protection against arbitrary discharge than an employee in a union
shop subject to explicit contract provisions that are enforceable by arbitration.
Exceptions to the doctrine of employment at will are certainly no major
cause of the continuing decline in union membership. These doctrinal
changes may even make management marginally more receptive to unions,
because the alternative of costly suits can be much less attractive than an
orderly grievance procedure. But the at-will litigation surely does nothing to
make employees more receptive to the appeal of unions; it may make them
marginally less receptive to unions, because it makes available a nonunion
alternative affording security against arbitrary dismissal. The lure of precisely
such job security traditionally constituted a major attraction of unionization.
To be sure, changes in the employment at will doctrine are not
attributable to federal regulation, although it should be noted that much of
the state law in this area has actually been made by lower federal courts. 28
Nevertheless, the decline of employment at will fits the general picture very
well. Common law exceptions to employment at will impose uniform
requirements on the work relation as a matter of public regulation, signifying,
above all, the deprivatization of the employment relation and what I should
like to call the pluralization of labor law. What began as one fairly coherent
scheme in 1935 has become many schemes. Indeed, even some of the newer
federal regulatory schemes have their own multilayered features.
Enforcement of some statutes, such as the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 (OSHA), is delegated to state agencies that present acceptable
enforcement plans.29  More than twenty states participate in OSHA
enforcement, thus proliferating the agencies involved and adding-as the
employment at will cases also add-a federal-state or vertical dimension to the
horizontal complexity that I have depicted.
What has emerged, then, is a speckled pattern of rights and remedies.
Standing, sequencing, duplication, and finality are among the issues long
recognized to arise from the pattern of statutory and decisional accretion
sketched here. What is more rarely discussed is at least equally fundamental:
the anomalous combination of intense regulation and intense indifference.
Powerful efforts are devoted to securing uniformity on some matters. In
principle, at least, no one, anywhere, working for any employer affecting
interstate commerce, can be dismissed for racially or sexually discriminatory
reasons-although the mode of redress for such a dismissal may well vary,
depending on whether the employee is subject to a collective agreement with
a grievance procedure. Equally powerful efforts are devoted to guaranteeing
diversity on other matters, most notably the decision of employees to engage
in collective bargaining, on which turns the employees' freedom from
28. See, e.g., Klages v. Sperry Corp., 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2463 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Sherman v. St.
Barnabas Hosp., 535 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); cf. Cales v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 300 F. Supp.
155 (W.D. Va. 1969).
29. See Viscusi, The Structure and Enforcement of Job Safety Regulation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1986, at 129, 136.
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arbitrary discipline or discharge on any but the grounds forbidden by statute
or state judicial decisions. A few subject areas thus receive intense scrutiny,
but there is virtually no mechanism to regulate a matter that is presumably of
far greater importance to most employees most of the time: actual working
conditions. Short of discrimination, short of violation of pay, pension, or
safety standards, and short of discharge, nonunion employers in the private
sector remain free to embitter the lives of employees with disagreeable
physical surroundings, oppressive foremen, or an unpleasant workplace
atmosphere. On these matters, laissez-faire is alive and well. The patchwork
extremes, of regulation and immunity from regulation, can only be explained
in terms of the incremental process by which regulatory measures were
enacted against a historical background that placed the constitutionality of
even the framework regulation in doubt as late as 1937.30
It goes without saying-but it needs underscoring-that this complex
system, with all of its anomalies and loose ends, is quintessentially American.
In countries with centralized collective bargaining and collective agreements
with widespread or universal effect, the mix of public and private rights, the
proliferation of overlapping and conflicting forums, and the contrast between
uniformity and diversity would be inconceivable. 3 1 The American law of
employment has approximately the neatness and symmetry of a Kandinsky
canvas.
This mix, this proliferation, this contrast form the subject of the present
issue. The aim is to explore the new public-law labor law, the labor law that
has its source in federal statute and that reaches into virtually every
employment relation, regardless of whether the relation subsists in a right-to-
work state or not, in a shop subject to a collective agreement or not. The
contributors impart a sense of these rights and remedies and how they fit with
the old labor law. Despite the diversity of the subject matter, the collection
also provides the flavor of what the statutory arrangements have in common
and what they do not, as well as how and with what effect they are enforced.
It has been said that inside every large problem there is a small problem
struggling to get out. The small problems of each of these fields hold a
considerable degree of intrinsic interest. Nevertheless, what puts them all in
the same arena is the large problem, the new labor regulation that is public,
rights-oriented, and enforced uniformly. The collection of papers assembled
here amply documents the wide range of protections that have their source in
federal statutory law. Of this we are already certain: it is no longer adequate
to speak of labor relations law. It has become necessary to speak of the
public-private mix in labor law and of the regulation of work, from
recruitment all the way to retirement.
30. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
31. See Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1394
(1971).
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